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The Social Dimension of European Union Trade Policies
BART KERREMANS* AND JAN ORBIE**
Abstract. The European Union (EU) is widely considered as a formidable trade power. 
It represents about one fourth of worldwide trade fl ows and generally speaks with one 
voice in its common commercial policies. In addition, policy-makers and scholars often 
regard the Union as a distinctive, ‘normative power’ in the world. From this perspective, 
Europe tries to be at the forefront of promoting values such as human rights, democracy, 
sustainable development, and social justice, this with a clear preference for supporting 
international dialogue and cooperation in these areas, rather than for using trade sanctions. 
This special issue combines both aspects of the EU’s international role. More specifi cally, 
it concerns the social dimension of the EU’s trade policies. It raises the questions of how, 
why, and with what impact the EU has promoted social objectives through its common 
commercial policies. These three questions will be addressed in this introduction, followed 
by a brief summary of the way in which the different contributions of this special issue 
deal with them.
I  European Union Trade and Social Objectives? Filling a Gap 
in the Literature
Trade liberalization and its social impact is a hot topic these days. Only recently, 
in June 2009, a ‘Trade Reform, Accountability, Development and Employment 
(TRADE) Act’ was introduced in the US House of Representatives which outlines 
a possible new trade and globalization agenda that fully takes into account social 
and environmental concerns. The bill boasts a list of 106 original co-sponsors 
out of 435 US House members. This reveals that the potential for political mobi-
lization on trade policy is signifi cant, and as such, that it can trigger support for 
protectionism even in a developed country like the United States. The European 
Union (EU) struggles with the same question, even if its reaction may be differ-
ent.1 This is refl ected in its ongoing internal debate between notions of ‘managed 
globalization’ or ‘harnessing globalization’ on the one hand,2 and on the other 
 * Associate Professor of International Relations and American Politics at the KU Leuven.
 ** Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University.
 1 Compare B. Burgoon, ‘The Rise and Fall of Labor Linkage in Globalization Politics’, Interna-
tional Politics 41 (2004): 201–204.
 2 Compare S. Meunier, ‘Managing Globalization? The EU in International Trade Negotiations’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (2007): 905–926; J. Orbie, ‘The European Union’s Role 
in World Trade: Harnessing Globalisation?’, in Europe’s Global Role. External Policies of the 
 European Union, ed. J. Orbie (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 46–55.
European Foreign Affairs Review 14: 629–641, 2009. 
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hand, the need for Europe to fully engage in global competition,3 to exploit its 
‘design and quality premium’ (European Commission, 2004), and along the way, 
to experience the long-term (Schumpeterian) benefi ts of such an endeavour. In 
addition, external trade policy is one of the EU’s most important tools, if not the 
most important one, for its international presence.4 Trade however, as Holland 
observed, is a composite policy with numerous ramifi cations for other domains, 
and as such an area with lots of opportunities for entrepreneurial political actors.5 
The potential for what Kelley calls ‘domain offence’6 – the expansion of activities 
that the organization already does well (or believes to do so) – is thus substantial, 
and with it, the roots of suspicion for those who oppose this.
In the past decade, the EU has committed itself to promoting the social 
 dimension of globalization.7 European policy-makers’ discourse in this regard has 
mainly focused on the promotion of labour standards through EU trade instru-
ments. Despite this explicit political commitment, the academic literature has 
barely examined the social dimension of the EU’s common commercial policies. 
An increasing amount of scholarly attention is being paid to the so-called ‘new 
trade agenda’ of the EU, going beyond at-the-border issues such as tariffs and 
quotas and considering behind-the-border issues such as services, investment, 
intellectual property rights, and competition rules.8 Within this debate however, 
the role of social standards and social objectives in the EU’s trade policies has 
been understudied. At the same time, there is an extensive literature on the link-
age between international trade and social policies. Indeed, the debate on a ‘social 
clause’ in trade relations has been studied from political science, law, and eco-
nomic  perspectives.9 This body of research mainly looks at the theoretical debate, 
the economic consequences, and the perspectives of the United States, developing 
 3 H. Zimmerman, ‘Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China’s and  Russia’s 
WTO Accession’, Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (2007): 813–832.
 4 S. Meunier & K. Nicolaïdis, ‘The European Union as a Confl icted Trade Power’, Journal of 
European Public Policy 13 (2006): 912.
 5 M. Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), 140.
 6 J. Kelley, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (2006): 31.
 7 European Commission, ‘Promoting core labour standards and improving social governance 
in the context of globalisation’, COM (2001) 416; European Commission, ‘The Social Dimension 
of Globalisation – the EU’s policy contribution on extending the benefi ts to all’, COM (2004) 383; 
J. Orbie & L. Tortell (eds), The European Union and the Social Dimension of Globalization: How 
the EU Infl uences the World (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
 8 A.R. Young & J. Peterson, ‘The EU and the New Trade Politics’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 13 (2006): 795–814.
 9 E. Lee, ‘Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of Issues’, International Labour 
Review 136 (1997): 173–189; OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core 
Workers’ Rights and International Trade (Paris: OECD, 1996); S. Charnovitz, ‘The Infl uence of 
International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview’, International 
Labour Review 123 (1987): 565–585; Burgoon, supra n. 1.
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countries, and the World Trade Organization (WTO); but the role of the EU and its 
Member States has largely been neglected.
The special issue tries to fi ll this gap in the scholarly research by examining the 
social dimension of EU trade policies from a multidisciplinary perspective. We 
use a building-block approach whereby the various articles each provide different 
parts of the puzzle. This research puzzle consists of three questions and research 
objectives that run through the issue: how, why, and with what effect has the EU 
promoted social objectives through its common commercial policies?10
The fi rst aim of this special issue is a descriptive one, namely providing a com-
prehensive and insightful overview of the subject area. It asks what the social 
elements in the EU’s trade policies are. More specifi cally, various sub-questions 
emerge: How has Europe’s position on a social clause in international trade evolved 
over the years? How are ‘social objectives’ defi ned by European policy-makers 
in the context of trade? What are the preferences of the European actors (e.g., 
Commission, Member States, European Parliament, civil society, and economic 
groups) in this area? What is the institutional framework of trade arrangements 
where traces of attention for the social dimension of trade policy can be found (at 
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral levels, and with regard to corporate social 
responsibility schemes)? What is the substantive content of these arrangements 
(punitive or incentive; labour rights, and/or human rights; extent to which social 
issues are included)? What is the EU’s position on this issue within multilateral 
institutions (WTO and International Labour Organization (ILO)) and towards its 
trading partners (in particular developing countries)? To what extent does the EU 
have a distinctive and pro-active approach compared with other trading powers 
such as the United States?
The second aim of this special issue is explanatory. It tries to account for the 
social content of the EU’s external trade policies. Three lines of explanation can 
be identifi ed: the economic motives behind a social clause (interests), the bureau-
cratic dynamics inside the EU bodies, including the Commission and the Coun-
cil (institutions), and the Union’s normative objectives (ideas). More specifi cally, 
it concerns the impact of trade liberalization and the countervailing pressures it 
generates to expanding trade policy-making into the social fi eld; the institutional 
interest to expand the EU’s international presence, the entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties that the social impact of trade liberalization generates for such an expansion, 
and the normative ambition to use such presence for ethical purposes (‘to make the 
world a better place’). In what follows, we will briefl y present the EU’s approach 
to the social dimension of its trade policies. In the subsequent and fi nal part of the 
 10 This special issue is part of a wider research project on the EU and the social dimension of glo-
balization (see also <www.eu-sdg.ugent.be>; Orbie & Tortell, supra n. 7; and J. Orbie & L. Tortell 
(eds), ‘Symposium: Europe’s Global Social Role’, Journal of European Social Policy 19 (2009): 
99–104.
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article, we will outline the theoretical background of each of the above-mentioned 
perspectives, with cross-references to the contributions to this special issue.
II  The Evolving Attention of the EU for the Social Dimension 
in Its External Trade Policies
The EU’s attention for the social dimension of its external trade policies has 
evolved in an interesting way. Although the increasing contestation of globalization 
brought with it an increased attention for the multilateral trade-related instruments 
that could be used for social protection purposes, the backlash of that approach 
at the multilateral level – specifi cally in the context of the WTO – resulted in the 
emergence of an EU preference away from trade sanctions, core labour standards 
(CLS), and the WTO, and to a focus on a broader and more ambitious international 
social agenda, including through increased collaboration (even partnership) with 
the ILO.11 This preference manifested itself especially in the European Commis-
sion, confronted as it was with contradictory pressures from the EU Member States 
with regard to the social dimension of international trade. This was not only visible 
in the EU’s approach to multilateral trade, but equally in its bilateral trade agree-
ments with numerous countries.
Indeed, one can identify the emergence of the discussion on trade-related 
social clauses in the EU in the context of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
 Agreements in Marrakech in 1994, and the politicization of that discussion in the 
context of the rising contestation of globalization between 1997 and 1999. How-
ever, the EU was internally divided on the strategy to follow (see also Burgoon 
in this issue). Even if its Member States entertained a general preference for the 
rewarding of countries that respect the ILO’s CLS, divergence of opinion rapidly 
emerged on the role that the WTO had to play in this, and thus on the extent to 
which the CLS needed to be integrated in the multilateral trade regime. In this 
debate, the Commission and the European Parliament, and EU Member States 
like France and Belgium were pitted against Germany and the United Kingdom. 
The latter particularly stressed that, as the WTO is ‘a trade organization, not a 
social organization’, there was no room for integrating the respect for CLS in the 
WTO’s agenda or in the WTO’s agreements. The ultimate intra-EU compromise – 
a permanent joint forum between the WTO and the ILO where the issue of social 
clauses in trade agreements could be discussed – fell fl at in the context of the failed 
WTO Seattle Ministerial in 1999, and the clear opposition of the WTO’s increas-
ing number of developing members against social clauses, let alone social-clause-
related trade sanctions, in the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements. As Orbie and 
 11 Cf. J. Orbie & O. Babarinde, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalization and European Union 
Development Policy: Promoting Core Labour Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility’, 
 Journal of European Integration 30 (2008): 459–477; Orbie & Tortell, supra n. 7.
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Tortell indicate,12 the Commission needed (and largely succeeded) in bending its 
approach to external social issues away from the social clause and CLS, and to the 
larger question of social governance. The Commission’s motives were clear: it 
feared that attempts to include labour standards in the WTO would jeopardize the 
launch of what became the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). In the setting and 
launching of that agenda, it had indeed, become crystal-clear that the support of a 
wide range of developing countries had become necessary, and that dropping the 
idea of a social clause in the WTO was a necessary condition to get it. The venue 
shift from the WTO to the ILO was a logical corollary here, as the Commission’s 
2001 communication on ‘Promoting CLS and Improving Social Governance in the 
Context of Globalization’ shows.13 Moreover, it also implied an upgrading of the 
relationship between the EU and ILO. As such, ‘the European debate on a social 
clause through trade (…) effectively disappeared within a comprehensive set of 
alternative instruments and objectives’,14 or rather, was integrated in a larger more 
comprehensive set of alternative instruments and approaches. And the linkage with 
the ILO is clear in almost any of them. Examples are the GSP+ system created with 
the EU’s Generalized System of Preference (GSP) reform (see Orbie and Tortell 
in this issue), and the increased attention for social cooperation and social gover-
nance – largely through positive sanctions – in the EU’s ever growing network of 
bilateral trade agreements (see Kerremans and Gistelinck in this issue). In some of 
these, however, clear reference is made to the CLS. Examples are the Trade and 
Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, the Association 
Agreement with Chile, and more recently, the Economic Partnership Agreement 
with Cariforum. The European Commission wants to insert even more explicit 
language on social issues in the ‘new generation’ of free trade agreements that are 
currently being negotiated with Latin American and Asian developing countries 
(see Bossuyt in this issue). Moreover, the EU’s recent free trade  agreements refer 
to schemes on corporate social responsibility, thereby involving the private sector 
in the promotion of the social dimension of globalization (see Voiculescu in this 
issue).
III  Explaining the EU’s Policies: Interests, Institutions, and Ideas
1.  Trade Liberalization and Countervailing Pressures
Liberalizing trade raises questions about competitiveness, comparative advantages, 
and ultimately jobs. Among these, the question whether international trade creates 
or destroys jobs is most prominent, and with it questions about the conditions of 
international trade that entail such creation or destruction. Here, the absence of an 
 12 Orbie & Tortell, supra n. 7, 8.
 13 Orbie & Tortell, supra n. 7.
 14 Ibid., 10.
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international social level playing fi eld is seen by many as particularly problematic. 
Jobs in the EU are destroyed, it is claimed, because trade liberalization puts them 
in direct competition with lowly paid and lowly regulated jobs elsewhere. On the 
other hand, trade liberalization may create export opportunities as well, especially 
when it takes place on a reciprocal basis. As such, it may lead to the creation 
of new jobs inside the EU, jobs that tend, several economists claim, to be better 
paid on average, than jobs in sectors that exclusively focus on production for the 
domestic market. In other words, when it comes to trade liberalization and social 
regulation, countervailing pressures are at work. Those that fear job losses believe 
that the creation of a social level playing fi eld may lead to fairer competition. 
Those that see the export opportunities tend to perceive such a creation as a dis-
guised form of protectionism or at least entertain suspicions in that sense. Similar 
suspicions exist in lots of developing countries who fear that a social level playing 
fi eld would erase the comparative advantages they now have in large parts of the 
products they produce for export to developed economies such as the EU Member 
States (see Gonzalez in this issue). For them, the opportunity costs of international 
social regulation may be substantial if not, as some fear, prohibitive.
These fears and suspicions on both sides of the debate make it diffi cult to dis-
connect the debate on the social impact of the EU’s external trade policy from the 
question of commercial interests. What may be presented as a question of fairness 
is easily perceived therefore, as a question of economic self-interest. This may 
be rightly or wrongly. But at least it points at the fact that pleas for international 
social regulation because of reasons of fairness are diffi cult to disentangle from 
pleas that are inspired by material self-interests (see, however, Burgoon in this 
issue). The latter does not need to surprise. As indicated by endogenous tariff 
theory,15 the costs from trade liberalization are often concentrated either in a num-
ber of sectors or with the owners of the production factor that is relatively scarce 
(in case of the EU: labour). As such, these losers experience a strong incentive to 
mobilize politically against liberalization and in favour of protection. Even if this 
does not mean that they are by defi nition successful, mobilization itself may be 
suffi cient to raise suspicions about the motives behind pleas for an international 
social level playing fi eld and about the receptivity of public policy-makers to such 
pleas.
This raises the questions why and to what extent such fears have indeed  mobilized 
policy-makers in the EU and its Member States, infl uencing the EU’s position 
on a social clause in international trade (see Burgoon in this issue). It equally 
touches on the question whether the EU has resorted to trade sanctions based on 
labour standard violations in third countries, in contrast with an incentive-based 
and developmental approach (see Orbie and Tortell in this issue). In order to exam-
ine these issues, we should also gain insight into the economic impact (if any) of 
 15 F. McGillivray, ‘Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs’, 
American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 596.
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the social clauses in EU unilateral and bilateral trade instruments, and thus, their 
potential for protectionist exploitation. The latter question will not be examined in 
this special issue but requires attention in future research.
2.  Entrepreneurial Opportunities for an Expanded International Presence
As the debate on the social impact of trade policies has become increasingly promi-
nent in the EU, opportunities have emerged for the Commission to expand the EU’s 
international presence, and in doing so, its own role. Part of the motivation to do so 
is related to the question of legitimacy. Rising concerns about  globalization and its 
impact have eroded the legitimacy of the EU’s external trade policy –  particularly 
its multilateral trade policy – and have attracted the attention of relatively new 
actors in the trade policy fi eld such as non-governmental organization (NGOs), 
national parliaments, and ministries previously unconcerned about trade but whose 
responsibilities are now affected by the consequences of trade policies. And as 
Young and Peterson observe: ‘Once mobilised over trade policy, these new trade 
actors often become pro-active, seeing trade rules not only as a threat to their pol-
icy objectives, but also as a possible tool for realizing them.’16 As such, these new 
actors contributed to the politicization of trade policy-making. The Commission 
has been the main target in this delegitimization and of this politicization. With 
it, an inherent interest emerged for the Commission to try to counter this dynamic 
by paying more attention to the ways in which the legitimacy of the EU’s external 
trade policies could be restored. Commission attention for the social dimensions of 
globalization, and the ways to manage these could thus be expected.
As such, one could claim that among the drivers of the debate on these topics, 
the Commission has been particularly prominent, if not the most prominent insti-
tutional actor. This has been most visible in the Commission’s role in the framing 
of the EU’s approach to globalization as pointed out by Meunier.17 As such, the 
possibilities for the Commission to engage in such an endeavour can be signifi cant, 
albeit often severely constrained. As Meunier observes, there is a potential for the 
Commission to repackage – through framing – the goals of the Member States 
‘into a coherent, single EU position and, in the process [to] tweak their preferences 
at the margin’.18 The opportunity to do so grows whenever the politicization level 
of the Member States’ preferences is relatively low on the one hand, and whenever 
the Member States are anxiously searching for solutions to problems with which 
they are confronted through societal pressure on the other hand. In such cases, 
opportunities for the Commission arise to provide and ‘pilot’ focal points for the 
 16 Supra n. 8, 801.
 17 Supra n. 2.
 18 Ibid., 909.
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solution to these problems.19 The potential to do so increases as the debate can be 
initiated and framed in terms of general principles. Such principles can be more 
readily used as focal points.20 As such, the Commission can drive the debate on 
the problems at stake, and can act as a fi rst mover by proposing solutions. With 
regard to the social impact of globalization and the needed response by the EU, the 
Commission has exactly played this role. Here, solutions have been looking for a 
problem and problems have been looking for a solution.
At the same time, the limits of such a role have become visible as well. The 
Commission’s leeway has indeed been constrained as a consequence of Member 
States’ suspicions about a possible hidden agenda, namely efforts by the Commis-
sion to expand its role, and to encroach upon Member State legal competences 
in the area of social policy. The formal competences of the European Commu-
nity to promote international labour rights and to develop EU policies in the ILO 
are indeed limited.21 The Commission’s capacity to act has also been constrained 
by internal suspicion and opposition, especially from the part of DG Trade inside 
the Commission. Indeed, as Van den Hoven points out, when studying the role 
of the Commission in trade policy-making, one needs to pay attention to the fact 
that the Commission itself is an institution that is affected signifi cantly by internal 
bureaucratic competition.22 Divergent opinions within the Council of Ministers 
and the European Commission can explain why the EU seems to be hesitating 
between an export-oriented, competitive ‘Global Europe’ strategy based on the 
principles of free trade, and a more balanced and interventionist strategy aiming 
for human rights and gender equality (see True in this issue).
This line of explanation raises several questions that will be addressed in the 
special issue. To what extent has the European Commission indeed taken the lead, 
both within the EU and internationally, in arguing for a social clause in trade rela-
tions? Has the Commission managed to frame the EU’s approach in a way that its 
legitimacy and interests can be advanced, or has it been confronted by political and 
legal obstacles in doing so? For example, Bossuyt’s analysis in this issue points 
to both the Commission’s entrepreneurial role in arguing for a social clause in the 
name of ‘coherence’, and the limits it experiences in doing so. True’s analysis of 
the EU’s pursuit of gender equality through trade also points at the constraints 
 19 M. Elsig, The EU’s Common Commercial Policy. Institutions, Interests and Ideas (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002), 130; M.A. Pollack, The Engines of European Integration. Delegation, Agency, and 
Agenda Setting in the EU (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 50.
 20 D.A. Lax & J.K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator. Bargaining for Cooperation and 
 Competitive Gain (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 73.
 21 T. Novitz, ‘Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Global Social Governance: An 
Assessment of EU Competence to Implement Commission Proposals’, European University Institute 
Working Papers, RSC 59 (2002).
 22 A. Van den Hoven, ‘Bureaucratic Competition in EU Trade Policy. EBA as a Case of  Competing 
Two-Level Games?’, in European Union Trade Politics and Development. ‘Everything but Arms’ 
Unravelled, eds G. Faber & J. Orbie (London: Routledge, 2007), 60–73.
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faced by the Commission. More generally, the question emerges what the impact 
is of the institutional architecture of the EU on the role that the Commission and 
other actors can play – e.g., compared with the political system in the United States 
and other developed countries. In this respect, Kerremans and Gistelinck (in this 
issue) emphasize the aggregative role of political parties in explaining why in the 
debate on a social clause in EU Member States the sectoral, more locally based 
interests are ‘superseded’ by more general, national interests.
3.  Norm Entrepreneurship and Normative Ambitions
Rights-talk is empowering in that it affi rms the inherent dignity of rights-bearers 
and awards political legitimacy to their demands for the satisfaction of their, oth-
erwise overlooked, material needs.
With this reference to the political legitimacy potential of the framing of issues 
in terms of rights, most prominently human rights,23 one can see what potential 
this can generate for norm entrepreneurs with institutional ambitions. But apart 
from this, a tremendous potential also exists with regard to the substantive con-
cerns and ambitions a norm entrepreneur may have, especially in the context of a 
political system that is highly receptive to such concerns and ambitions. That is 
exactly the case with the EU and the way in which it tends to defi ne its role in the 
international system. In this defi nition, the ‘ethics of responsibility’ towards others 
plays a signifi cant role.24 As such, the EU can be seen as ‘a self-proclaimed ethical 
power’.25 This self-proclamation is partly rooted in the sense of community the EU 
itself represents,26 and the kind of substantive values that this community wants to 
refl ect (internally) and transpose externally.
This also links up with the notion of Europe as a normative power in the world, 
which was pioneered by Ian Manners in 2002 and has since become a pervasive 
(if contested) concept in research to the EU’s international policies as well as in 
policy-makers’ discourse on Europe’s global role. This concept encompasses three 
features, each of them suggesting that the EU is normatively different and that mate-
rial interests alone cannot adequately account for Europe’s external action: the EU 
itself is a normatively constructed polity, which predisposes it to act in a norma-
tive way in the world, and this norm diffusion is realized in a non-coercive way by 
shaping the conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations.27 This  corresponds 
 23 M. Pieterse, ‘Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating 
Social Hardship Revisited’, Human Rights Quarterly 29 (2007): 797.
 24 S. Lucarelli, ‘Introduction’, in Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, eds S. 
Lucarelli & I. Manners (London: Routledge, 2006), 1–18.
 25 A. Hyde-Price, ‘A “Tragic Actor”? A Realist Perspective on “Ethical Power Europe”’, 
 International Affairs 84 (2008): 30.
 26 T. Dunne, ‘Good Citizen Europe’, International Affairs 84 (2008): 19.
 27 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common  Market 
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with the EU’s stated objective of ‘exporting the European social model’ from the 
intra-EU realm to the international scene. Interestingly, Manners considers ‘social 
solidarity’ as a minor norm whereas ‘human rights’ are considered a ‘core norm’ of 
the EU.28 Applied to the topic of this issue, the question is what the status is of the 
social objectives advanced through EU trade policies, particularly in relation to the 
EU’s promotion of human rights in the world. Some researchers suggest that the 
EU’s external policies have prioritized the fi rst generation of human rights (civil 
and political rights) over the second generation (social and economic rights)29 but 
this claim has not been examined in detail by studies of the Union’s external trade 
policies. In his concluding refl ections to this special issue, Manners argues that ‘a 
clear-cut distinction between civil-political and  economic-socio-cultural rights is 
increasingly diffi cult to maintain’. He suggests that the EU’s policies favouring the 
social dimension of globalization may take a step towards squaring this circle.
With regard to those values in the context of trade and economics, and the 
so-called ‘European social model’, a strong emphasis is being put on the notion 
of distributive justice that – as Van den Hoven observes – is rooted in ‘a general 
distrust of the market to deliver “justice” or a fair distribution of the economic 
gains’.30 In the same vein, but with more emphasis on the ways in which distribu-
tive justice has to be achieved, Dunne observes:
Europeans have a relatively large amount of trust in the organizational and steer-
ing capacity of the state, while remaining sceptical toward the achievements of 
the markets (…) They maintain a preference for the welfare state’s guarantees 
of social security and for regulations on the basis of solidarity (…).31
Inherent to such a notion of distributive justice is the idea of rights and entitle-
ments and thus the conviction that all human beings are entitled to a minimum level 
of prosperity and economic security, irrespective of the outcomes of market-driven 
processes. Intricately linked to these substantive entitlements is the notion of asso-
ciative rights, both as a value in itself,32 and as a way to promote the respect for 
substantive rights. This brings us of course in the area of socio-economic human 
rights and their relation with the EU’s trade and development policies. The linkage 
between human rights and the social impact of trade is strongest with regard to 
Studies 40 (2002): 235–258.
 28 Ibid., 242–243.
 29 E. Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (The Hague/ London/
New York: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), 43; A. Clapham & J.B. Martignoni, ‘Are We There Yet? In Search 
of a Coherent EU Strategy on Labour Rights and External Trade’, in Social Issues, Globalisation and 
International Institutions, eds V.A. Leary & D. Warner (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 291.
 30 Van den Hoven, ‘The European Union Regulatory Capitalism and Multilateral Trade 
 Negotiations’, in eds Lucarelli & Manners, supra n. 24, 195.
 31 Dunne, supra n. 26, 20.
 32 I. Manners, ‘The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European Union’, 
in eds Lucarelli & Manners, supra n. 24, 34–35.
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the CLS of the ILO (see Orbie and Tortell in this issue). The position is then that 
because it concerns human rights, they should apply in all countries, whatever their 
level of economic development. Among these are the elimination of exploitative 
child labour, the prohibition on forced labour, non-discrimination in employment, 
the freedom of association, and the right of collective bargaining. Beyond these 
standards, defi ning a trade-related social policy proves to be much more diffi cult 
not least because of the fi erce resistance of several developing countries,33 suspi-
cious as they are about the real (protectionist) intentions that may be disguised by 
a human rights discourse and Western or European notions of distributive justice 
(see Gonzalez in this issue).
Given such resistance, the question rapidly emerges what price the EU is 
 prepared to pay for its trade-related external social policies. The answer to that 
question is largely affected by the level of agreement on this matter among the 
Member States. Overall, it seems that as soon as the EU departs from general 
principles in its search for more concrete policy measures, the Member States face 
diffi culties in getting beyond a minimalist lowest common denominator. This is 
not only visible in the EU’s approach to labour standards in the WTO, but equally 
in the way in which it approaches labour standards in its bilateral preferential trade 
agreements. Despite its normative ambitions therefore, there seem to be clear limits 
in what the EU is able (and willing) to deliver. Although expectations for a global 
social Europe may be high among the EU institutions, several civil society actors 
and some Member States, the EU’s capability to impact normatively in this area 
seems to be limited by its nature as a regulatory state (see Bossuyt in this issue).
Some articles in this special issue will shed more light on this. The contribution 
by Brian Burgoon will specifi cally focus on the normative dimension in the Euro-
pean debate on a social clause. Based on public opinion data in fi fteen EU Member 
States, he argues that political support for the trade-labour linkage is determined by 
left-oriented ideological beliefs rather than defensive economic interests which are 
more prevalent at the right of the ideological spectrum. It seems that the European 
social clause debate is affected by politics that are distinct from those in relation to 
general trade protectionism. More generally, Burgoon suggests that the academic 
literature on EU trade politics mainly looks at interests and institutions with a view 
to explaining the level of ‘protectionism’ or ‘free trade’, while ideational factors 
that cannot be subordinated to the protectionism – free trade pendulum have been 
underexplored.
As such, the three lines of explanation will be assessed in this special issue, one 
against the others, this especially in the concluding article where Ian Manners applies 
his tripartite analytical method in reviewing the fi ndings of this special issue. Are the 
EU’s actions with regard to the social dimension of trade policies always  determined 
by the limits imposed on it by the economic self-interests of each of its Member 
States? Or is it possible that more is going on, that despite the role that  economic 
 33 Compare Burgoon, supra n. 1, 204.
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self-interest plays, the EU has still been able to fi nd a way to deal with social policy 
issues in its external trade policies with normative  objectives in mind?
IV  Ambiguous Outcomes?
Apart from describing and explaining the social dimension of the EU’s external 
trade policies, some important considerations need to be made with respect to this 
issue. What are the consequences of the Union’s initiatives? Since the explana-
tions behind the EU’s policies in this area are complex and divergent, and the 
EU’s capacity to act is both facilitated and constrained by several factors, we can 
expect that the results will be equally multifaceted and perhaps ambiguous. As 
such,  analysing the outcomes of the EU’s policies can enhance our insight into 
the underlying motives behind its attempts to include social considerations in 
trade relations. However, it should be noted that the EU’s policies in the trade-
social nexus have only recently been established and are still being developed 
today. Therefore, any assessment of the EU’s sustainable infl uence in this domain 
will inevitably be tentative. A distinction could be made between the direct trade 
impact, the infl uence on domestic social policies, the consequences for the internal 
and external legitimacy of the EU, and ultimately the impact on the role that the 
‘social issue’ plays in global governance on trade.
First, the impact in terms of trade fl ows could be measured. The question is 
whether, and in which direction, the social provisions in the Union’s trade policies 
have affected trade fi gures between the EU and its trading partners. Social condi-
tionality could hinder trade in the case of sanctions, but social incentive regimes 
could also facilitate trade fl ows. The impact of the EU’s policies in this area could 
also be negligible. Another possible outcome is that the social elements in Euro-
pean trade policies have neither a facilitating nor a restrictive impact on trade 
fl ows, as they are mainly deployed in the form of development cooperation and/or 
political dialogue. This would mean that, in effect, the EU’s ‘social clauses’ are 
mainly part of its foreign and development policies, not its trade policies, even if 
they are introduced through its trade instruments. Although the direct impact on 
trade fi gures will not be gauged in this special issue, most articles analyse to what 
extent the EU has been using positive and negative trade conditionality, or other 
practices of foreign policy through trade. As for the GSP+ system, it will become 
clear that the EU has barely resorted to trade sanctions (see Orbie and Tortell in 
this issue) while its incentive system has been expanded. The EU’s bilateral trade 
agreements (see Kerremans and Gistelinck), including the new generation (see 
Bossuyt), also rely on information exchange and technical incentives rather than 
on enforcement. In its corporate social responsibility strategy, it appears that the 
EU combines a hard core set of principles with relatively soft implementation 
mechanisms (see Voiculescu in this issue).
Second, the transformative impact on the social policies in Europe’s trade part-
ners will be considered. This kind of impact is most closely related to the stated 
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objective of the EU, to advance the social dimension of globalization through the 
use if its trade leverage internationally. More specifi cally, the question will be 
raised whether the Union’s policies in this area – by affecting trade fl ows,  political 
dialogue, or development policies – have impacted on the observance of (core) 
labour standards in the targeted countries. In this respect, Europe’s infl uence on 
the ratifi cation and implementation of the ILO core conventions in its trading part-
ners will be particularly relevant. The analysis of Orbie and Tortell in this issue 
makes clear that the EU’s GSP+ system has spurred on the ratifi cation of ILO 
conventions in a number of countries, although the link with effective implemen-
tation remains debatable. Possible changes in the conduct of European businesses 
in developing countries, infl uenced by the EU’s corporate social responsibility 
schemes, will also be analysed (see Voiculescu in this issue). The relevance of 
the EU’s Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) will also be examined in this 
special issue, in particular in True’s article on gender equality as a global social 
objective of the EU.
Less tangible outcomes concern the internal and external legitimacy of the EU, 
and more specifi cally of the European Commission as the main European voice 
in trade issues. Bossuyt’s analysis in this issue makes an explicit link between the 
Commission’s pursuit of an ambitious social clause and its legitimacy. The ques-
tion emerges whether and to what extent the Union’s activities in the trade-social 
nexus, as well as the Commission’s framing of commercial policies as part of a 
broader and normative foreign policy agenda, have indeed infl uenced its legiti-
macy inside the EU. Have the Union’s policies in this area been contested by 
political parties in the Member States and by the European Parliament, or can they 
count on a broad level of support from the political scene? Are they considered 
as a substantial part of the EU’s external trade strategy, or merely as a redundant 
aspect that is subordinated to other trade policy goals? Similarly, the impact on 
Europe’s external legitimacy will be assessed. How are the EU’s initiatives in this 
area perceived ‘from the outside’ and how does this constitute the EU’s interna-
tional role?34 Are EU initiatives in relation to a social clause still regarded as veiled 
protectionism, are they seen as empty commitments, or has the Union’s managed 
to convince developing countries of the merits of an incentive-based, developmen-
tal approach? A positive answer to the last part of this question would contribute 
to breaking the impasse in the debate on a social clause and to re-establishing the 
idea that trade and social issues should be addressed together. If the EU indeed 
manages to present the trade-social nexus as something ‘normal’ in international 
relations, without provoking fears of hidden protectionism, it would truly have 
asserted itself as a normative power in the world.
 34 See Gonzalez in this issue; and N. Chaban, O. Elgström & M. Holland, ‘The European Union 
as Others See It’, European Foreign Affairs Review 11, no. 2 (2006): 245–262; S. Lucarelli (ed.), 
‘Beyond Self Perception: The Others’ View of the European Union’, European Foreign Affairs 
Review 3, special issue (2007).
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